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Rheumatoid Arthritis: Painful Motion 
is Limited Motion 
by Tyler Crowe 
Reporting on Petitti v. McDonald, No. 13-3469,       
____ Vet. App. ____ (October 28, 2015). 
In Petitti v. McDonald, the Court was asked to clarify 
what constitutes "painful motion" and what 
evidence the Board of Veterans’ Appeals must 
consider when making this determination in light of 
the interplay between 38 C.F.R. §4.71a, Diagnostic 
Code 5002 and 38 C.F.R. §4.59.  
Title 38 C.F.R. §4.71a, DC 5002 describes how 
rheumatoid arthritis (RA) is to be evaluated under 
the disability rating schedule.  Section 4.59 is one of 
several regulations that precede the rating schedule 
for the musculoskeletal system and explain how to 
arrive at proper evaluations under the DCs; it 
specifies that painful motion of a joint is to 
recognized as a disability. 
The issue arose from Mr. Petitti's RA, which 
presented while he was serving in the Air Force. The 
Board found Mr. Petitti to be entitled to a 40% 
disability, but the Board denied a disability rating 
over 40% for RA despite objective evidence of 
symptomology affecting multiple joints and a 
determination that Mr. Petitti's complaints of joint 
pain were credible.  The Board also determined that 
Mr. Petitti was not entitled to a 10% disability rating 
for each joint under §4.59 because the VA 
examinations showed neither limited motion on 
range-of-motion testing nor objective evidence of 
pain on movement.  
On appeal, the Court first reviewed DC 5002, 
pointing to specific language in DC 5002 stating that 
limitation of motion that is noncompensable under 
the DC for the affected joint may still be 
compensable on the basis of a minimum disability 
rating for each major joint or group of minor joints 
affected.  Limitation of motion may be objectively 
confirmed by satisfactory evidence of painful motion 
and is a prerequisite for both a compensable 
disability rating under the DC relevant to the 
particular joint involved and for a minimum 
disability rating. 
The Court next looked to §4.59, which ensures that 
a veteran experiencing an "actually" painful joint is 
entitled to at least the minimum compensable rating 
for the joint under the DC for the joint involved. 
Reading §4.59 and DC 5002 together, the Court 
found the terms "painful motion" and "actually 
painful joints" to be synonymous.  For further 
guidance regarding "painful motion," the Court 
looked to its prior interpretation of the relationship 
between §4.59 and DC 5003 (for degenerative 
arthritis) in Lichtenfels v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 484 
(1991), because of the striking similarities between 
the language in DCs 5002 and 5003 pertaining to the 
assignment of a minimum rating for 
noncompensable limitation of motion.  
In Lichtenfels, the Court held that, where arthritis is 
established, painful motion of a major joint or group 
of minor joints is deemed limited motion and 
entitled to a minimum 10% rating per joint even 
though there is no actual limitation of motion. 
Lichtenfels held that § 4.59 links painful motion and 
limitation of motion, so a claimant with painful 
motion is considered to have limited motion under 
DC 5003 even though actual motion is not limited.  
In the present matter, the Court concluded that the 
interpretation in Lichtenfels of the effect of § 4.59 on 
DC 5003 also applies to DC 5002.  When DC 5002 is 
read with § 4.59, painful motion of a joint is deemed 
limited motion of that joint, thus satisfying the 
requirement for limited motion under DC 5002 and 
entitling the claimant to the minimum disability 
rating for that joint under DC 5002 and § 4.59, even 
though the claimant does not have actual limitation 
of motion.  
The Court then moved to what constitutes painful 
motion and what type of evidence is sufficient under 
the regulation to verify painful motion.  DC 5002 
requires that limitation of motion be corroborated 
by a person other than the veteran based upon that 
person's observations.  DC 5002 also describes 
evidence that will "objectively confirm" limitation of 
motion as "satisfactory evidence of painful motion." 
The Court stated that "satisfactory evidence of 
painful motion" is capacious and encompasses not 
only a doctor’s observations but also lay description 
of a veteran's painful motion.  A lay description 
detailing observations of a veteran's difficulty 
undertaking various activities falls within 
"satisfactory evidence of painful motion" that has 
been "objectively confirmed."  The Court 
acknowledged that a veteran's own statements may 
be lay probative lay evidence when they describe 
symptoms capable of lay observation, citing 
Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d, 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 
2007), with the caveat that there must be objective 
confirmation from a person other than the veteran 
or claimant of a veteran's joint pain. 
When describing Mr. Petitti's disability, the Board 
had found that "[t]here is no doubt that pain exists 
that is daily and causes fatigue and stiffness," yet 
had determined that Appellant had no painful 
motion of the joints.  The Court found that the 
Board's conclusion was clearly erroneous.  The Court 
reversed the Board's finding and remanded the 
matter to the Board to determine the specific joints 
affected by RA and whether Mr. Petitti would 
receive a higher disability rating for the chronic 
residuals of his RA.  
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